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During the three-decade reign of former president Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian citizens were limited in their opportunities to participate in the socio-political sphere. The State lacked the resources and the necessary structures and institutions to harbour that form of discussion and debate. Those who wanted to express alternative opinions had no formal outlet to relieve their frustrations.
Naturally, this vacuum allowed for unorthodox entities to rise as an alternative form of protest and outward expression. For many, this came in the form of religious institutions or similar social structures. For others, football fandom became their preferred outlet. Interestingly, however, the rise of the Ultras Ahlawy also brought about a fresh wave of social and political activism.
Formed in 2005 as an online community, the Ultras Ahlawy (UA-07) group was created by disgruntled members of the Cairo-based Ahly Fans Club (AFC). They separated from the traditional fan club after growing concern over the Al-Ahly club board members’ influence over the association. Less than two years later, the now-infamous red devil pitchforks banner was featured for the first time in an April 13, 2007 match against ENPPI. It signaled the official start of Ultras fandom in Egypt.
Egypt’s football scene had never seen anything like it. Ultras Ahlawy members were remarkably well organized and strict in their stadium etiquette. They separated from the football associations that were funded by the Al Ahly club, which allowed them complete autonomy over their actions during matches.
They peppered the stadium with crimson flares, sang lengthy songs, and boasted about their newfound collective identity. They even carried 30 foot banners with inspirational slogans like “We Are Egypt.”
Confronting authority
As expected, Egypt’s government began to probe Ultras members in an attempt to determine the essence of the group and the nature of their relationship with state authority and control. State paranoia quickly morphed into police brutality, which brought about the start of a bloody relationship between Ultras members and the Egyptian police force.
In order to understand why the state would be interested in the affairs of a fan club, one need only look at how Egypt historically handles group gatherings.
For decades, Egypt operated under the Emergency Law, which allowed for limitless censorship, extended police control, and prohibited unauthorized gatherings. While this was generally imposed to quash unwanted political activity, it was also used to monitor Egypt’s youth and determine whether they pose a threat to the regime. This strategy remained in place well into Mubarak’s reign and even in the post-revolution space.
From the government’s perspective, the Ultras posed a potential threat to the government because of its passionate youth base with seemingly no radical agenda. Was this a political unit masquerading as a fan club? Was it a group of anarchist vandals looking for chaos? All those questions were enough for the government to raise concerns over the groups existence.
For the first few years following the group’s inception, the Ultras Ahlawy made very few political statements. Their concern was the lack of visibility in the public sphere and the constant resistance from state actors like the police apparatus. They were subject to invasive inceptions in stadiums and security forces opted for a heavy-handed approach to maintaining control during matches. On occasion, tensions led to clashes between the group and the police.
This inability to achieve rightful autonomy under Mubarak’s oppressive regime helped shape the Ultras combative approach and, eventually, their political message. Graffiti slogans were visible on street corners and stadium walls – what once began as outward displays of affection for the group and their football club became powerful statements of resistance and confrontation.
“Respect Existence or Expect Resistance.”
It is important to note the major differences between the Ultras political involvement prior to the 2011 uprising to their influence during the 18 days of chaos that marked the start of the revolution until Mubarak’s downfall.
While various Ultras members did make political statements and were involved in clashes that were framed as politically charged, the incidents highlighted individual interests rather than the actions of a collectivized group. The Ultras did not back a single political entity. What united them, instead, was their brotherhood and sense of camaraderie.
It was only during the revolution that the Ultras shed their skin and put their experience of fighting the police to use.
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Hussein Taha and Mohamed Makwa: names of the first members of the Ultras to become revolutionary martyrs, the first to die for a political purpose. They passed away on January 28, 2011, the turning point of the Egyptian Uprising better known as the ‘Friday of Rage.’ Their death was just a tragedy, however, but a spark that kindled unity in their fragmented brotherhood – a single unwavering reason for Ultras to join the revolution in full force.
They had lost their own.
Prior to January 25, 2011, the Ultras represented hardcore Egyptian football fan groups that confronted authority, opposed police control and the extreme censorship prevalent during the Mubarak regime. Determined to have their voices heard, young men gathered during football matches to chant slogans and erect infamous red devil pitchforks in the stands as symbolic opposition to the government and its vicious security forces.
Tension rose between football fanatics and the Egyptian government, which occasionally spilled out around the stadium in the form of scrimmages and clashes. Shocked by their determination and exceptional organization, the government grew paranoid about the group’s existence and lashed out in more brutal forms. As a result, the Ultras located a profound hatred for the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the security forces at the centre of their identity.
For nearly four years, the Ultras and the police clashed on Egyptian streets. Few would have guessed that the experience they gathered on those occasions would help them topple the regime years later.
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